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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

I

SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
.
corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

PEGGY ALLRED, aka PEGGY
LOVEJOY, aka THEL1\1:A
ALLRED,
Defendant and Appellant.

I

10752

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE HISTORY
OF THE CASE
A complaint was signed in the City Court on February 7, 1966 charging defendant with violating subsection ( 8) of 32-2-1, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
City, Utah 1965. The Defendant was convicted by a
jury in the City Court on April 20, 1966 and sentenced
to $299.00 and six months jail with jail confinement
suspended upon payment of the fine. She filed an
1

appeal April 20 ,1966 to the Third District Court and
was again found guilty by a jury on October 10, 1966
before the Honorable Merrill C. Faux and sentenced
to six months in the County Jail and a $299.00 fine with
five months of the jail sentence suspended upon payment of the fine. An appeal was filed October 17, 1966
and the matter is now before the Utah Supreme Court
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant in her brief argues there was no one to
be aided by her acts. The actual facts proved were.
Defendant, Thelma or Peggy Allred, aka Lovejoy,
was charged under Salt Lake City Ordinance 32-2-1
( 8) "In that said defendant, aided and abetted in the
commission of a crime, to-wit: said defendant directed
a Salt Lake Police Officer to a building, Room 506,
Ben Albert Apartment, 130 South 5th East, Salt Lake
City, to obtain sexual intercourse for hire" on February 4, 1966 at approx. 8:25 p.m.
Testimony adduced under oath was to the effect
that Salt Lake police officer, Stanley Jorgensen, on
January 13, 1966 ( R 39) commenced to go to the El
Dorado Club at 170 East 2nd South, Salt Lake City,
Utah and there investigated prostitution contacts by
gaining the confidence of manager Mel Jones (R L!O) .
That the officer on January 25, 1966 observed the
defendant in person (R 42) ; then on January 25, 1966
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the officer let Mel Jones know of an interest in girls
for $30 or $40 a night and getting exactly what you
want. He was referred to the redhead sitting at the bar
(Mrs. Allred) (R 49). On February 3, 1966 l\iel Jones
got a telephone number and called, then they waited
and Jones dialed again while the officer memorized
phone number 355-0529 and a conversation ensued
(R 49 & 51). Later in the evening about 9:30 p.m.
the phone rang and Mrs. Allred said to the officer
'' ... the girl has gone home for the night and would
tomorrow be all right" and gave the officer phone number 363-7373 ( R 54) (unlisted numer of Peggy Allred
at 130 South 5th East, Apartment 203) (R 59).
Then Peggy Allred indicated she "doesn't turn a trick
anymore-quit in July of 1965-all I do is make the
arrangements." (R 83). On January 4, 1966 at 8:25
p.m. the Officer called 363-7373 and talked to Peggy
Lovejoy, (Allred) (R 62). She advised him everything
was set up at Room 506, Ben Albert Apartment for
an hour for around $40 with Linda, a 24 year old
brunette (R 63). The officer went directly to that
address and in 506 found a known prostitute, Angie
Colonge, aka Papasoakis (R 64, convicted 3-30-66),
who identified herself as Linda, who let him in and
locked the door (R 70). She was a 24 year old, five
foot 3 inch, 120 lb. brunette (R 68). They discussed
"this sort of thing" arranged by the other person for
$40.00 (R 69) and a "half-and-half'', meaning half
phallicio and half sexual intercourse (R 71), whether
the money was to be paid now or after; to all of which
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she made no effort to evict the officer ( R 69) . That
a search after arrest showed the furnished apartment
contained only a sweater, whiskey, prophylactics and
the prostitute. The apartment was rented and paid
for by the Lovejoys-Allreds in the name of a "Elmer
Radecliffe," existence questionable (R 96). Thus in
aid of a bartender and prostitute, Mrs. Lovejoy directed a police officer to that room to obtain sex acts
for hire.
The City ordinance and its due enactment were
stipulated to by counsel and both sides rest_ed (R 100).
The jury returned a finding of guilty as charged.
POINTS ON APPEAL
Point I
The validity of 32-2-1 revised ordinances of Salt
Lake, City, Utah 1965 is not in issue as defendant is
limited to the relief sought in the prayer vis: constitutionality based upon clarity.
Point II
The appeal should be dismissed as the notice is
defective in that it specifies the "appeal" as based on
both the facts and the law."
Point III
The ordinance is clear and unambiguous thus placing persons on notice of what acts are criminal and thus
prohibited.
4

Point IV
32-2-1, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City,
Utah 1965 is a valid exercise of the municipal police

power in suppression of prostitution.
ARGUMENT
Point I

The Court will note at page 2 of Appellant's
brief the relief sought is a ruling on the constitutionality
of 32-2-1, Salt Lake City Ordinances. A constitution
is that by which the powers of government are limited
and to raise a "constitutional question" it must be
shown that the statute will be unconstitutional in any
event; hence inherently and totally invalid by reason of
lack of clarity, depriving of property without due
process, or otherwise infringing rights enumerated in
the bill of rights of the Federal Constitution.
It would appear then, that appellant does not ask

the court to rule on the other ground whereby this case
might reach the Supreme Court; that is, validity. Validity is defined by words and phrases as referring to
the power to enact the particular statute, and not merely
to its judicial construction or application. Boehringer
vs. Y arna County, 140 P. 507 ( p 12 Volume 44)
"Y alid", is defined as meaning to "test the validity of,
to make valid, confirm, good or sufficient in point of
law, efficacious, executed with the proper formalities,
. " citing Thompson vs. Town of Frostproof, 103
S. 118, 89 Fla. 92.
5

By failing to request a ruling on the power of the
Salt Lake City Commission to enact the ordinance
the Court can rule that appellant has narrowed the
issue before the Court by default in pleading and thus
consider only Point II argued by appellant.
Point II
Another procedural error on appeal is to be found
in the NOTICE OF APPEAL wherein appellant
asserts the "appeal is based on both the facts and the
Law".
This appeal is purportedly taken, pursuant to
Article VIII section 9 of the Utah Constitution:

"Section 9. (Appeals from district court From justices' courts.) From all final judgments of the district courts, there shall be a right
of appeal to the Supreme Court. The appeal
shall be upon the record made in the court below
and under such regulations as may be provided
by law. In equity cases the appeal may be on
questions of both law and fact; in cases at law
the appeal shall be on questions of law alone.
Appeals shall also lie from the final orders and
decrees of the Court in the administration of
decedent estates, and in cases of guardianship,
as shall be provided by law. Appeals shall also
lie from the final judgment of justices of the
peace in civil and criminal cases to the District
Courts on both questions of law and fact, with
such limitations and restrictions as shall be provided bv law; and the decision of the District
Courts ~n such appeals shall be final, except in
cases involving the validity of constitutionality
of a statute.
6

This Court has repeatedly upheld that prov1s10n
by ruling that the decision of the District Court is final
on the facts and the Law. Most recently in Salt Lake
City v. Frank Graniere #9911 and in State v. Lyte,
75 Utah 283, 284 P 1006 and in Salt Lake City v.
Perkins, 122 Utah 43, 245 P2d 1176.
Thus appellant in her notice fails to state grounds
for consideration of the case by the Supreme Court
and the appeal should be dismissed on procedural
grounds.
Point III
Appellant argues that 32-2-1 (7-8) is so vague and
ambiguous as to be unconstitutional and as authority
therefor cites an 1950 polygamous prosecution ,State
"·Musser, 223 P 2d 193, wherein defendant was charged
under section 103-11-1 U.C.A. 1943, making it a criminal offense for two or more persons to conspire " ( 5)
to commit any act injurious ... to public morals ... "
In that case no language nor historic fact nor other
law nor surrounding circumstance connected with the
enactment, showed any intent to limit the words "public morals" to other than face meaning so the statute
was held vague and uncertain under the 14th Amendment. It was claimed then that the statute failed to specify acts such as teaching polygamous doctrine so the
statute was changed and prosecution renewed on the
basis of an act declared to be unlawful.
We are not so unmindful of public rights of pro-
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tection that we allow known criminal plans, to rob,
destroy or kill, to be carried out in full before the weight
of the law can be applied. Just so the city ordinance
in question does not require the complainant to commit
an act of adultery, fornication or prostitution before
the pernicious practice of peddling human flesh can
be suppressed by application of legal process. The ordinance declares the act, of agreeing or offering to commit an act of sexual intercourse for hire, unlawful
and further that aiding or abetting such act by directing any person to any place for such act of sexual intercourse is also unlawful. That is what was charged and
proved and the words are clear and understandable
to even the most illiterate. Sexual intercourse is subject
to historical, medical and practical interpretation and
may be found in any dictionary. Aiding and abetting
are synonomous terms defined in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary as "To help; to further . . . one
who or that which promotes or helps in something done;
... " What could be of more help to a prostitute than
to rent a room for her use and direct men to that place.
What could be of more help to a bartender in providing
female companionship for his customers than the facts
proved and do not those acts of renting the room in a
false name and using unlisted phone numbers and
subterfuge in returning calls indicate a guilty mind
and actual knowledge that the acts done were unlawful?
To argue that acts such as lewd, meretricious display
and of moral perversion are vague, ignores the test of
whether the words are defined in law, by historic fact,·
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or in daily usage. Lewd is defined in 76-39-5 with lascivious or obscene and exposure of person or private
parts openly or in public or indecently or with any
person married or not and in Webster's as "lay, ignorant, vile . . . wicked, worthless; base 2 . . . Lustful,
lascivious; unchaste." All pointing to base sexual lust
and clear of understanding as stated in this court in
the case of Ogden City vs. McLaughlin (1888) 5 Utah
387, 16 p. 721, wherein a man and woman on a complaint before a Justice of the Peace demurred that
"resorting to a house of ill fame for lewdness . . . "
do not state facts constituting a public offense. In so
deciding the court found the city has power to "restrain
and punish . . . prostitutes". The facts charged
failed to show either was a prostitute or panderer. The
court said in effect the Ogden Charter § 35 gives power
over prostitutes but does not embrace the offense of
lewdness unless "it be the lewdness of prostitutes" ...
"It does not authorize the restraining of prostitution,
except it be by restraining in some way the prostitutes"
... or "keepers of bawdy and other disorderly houses
§ 9. Compiled Laws 697 was designed to break up
houses of ill fame and punish the keepers thereof but
that man and woman weren't claimed to be keepers
in contradistinction to what has been alleged and proved
in the instant case.
The term meretricious display is defined in Webster's is I. Of, pertaining to, characteristic of, or being
a prostitute. 2. Alluring by false show; gaudily and
deceitfully ornamental. Moral perversion is defined as
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"a maladjustment of the sexual life, such that satisfaction is sought in aberrant ways that is exceptional;
abnormal.
In support of the proposition that the words of Salt
Lake Ordinance 32-2-1 (7 & 8) are clear and unambiguous, I will cite a few more indefinite expressions
which have been upheld. In re Hubbard (1964) 62
A.C. 116, 396 P2d 809, an ordinance prohibiting participation in any "game of chance" was held not void
for uncertainty as a person of common and ordinary
intelligence can distinguish, see also: U.S. vs. Petrillo,
332 U.S. 1. Also upheld are "dissolute" and "immoral",
People v. Deibert, 256 P 2d 355; "to make diligent
effort to find the owner"; "unreasonable speed"; "unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering"; and "to
the annoyance of any other person". Lorenson v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 49, 216 P 2d 859; "satisfactory" Moyant v. Porames, 30 N.J. 528, 154 A 2d 9
(1959), "good", Brielle vs. Zeigler, 73 N.J. Super
352, 179 A 2d 789 (1962); "public peace", Bohler v.
Lane, 204 F Supp 168; "obscene matter", City of Cincinnati v. Coy, 182 N E 2d 628; "necessary food", People v. Yates (1931), 298 P 961, 114 Cal. App. (Supp)
782.
Thus it is sufficient, to comply with the legislative requirement of due process of law, if the crime
be set out in words well enough known to enable those
persons within its reach to understand and correctly
apply them. State ex rel Cox v. Bd. of Education, 21
Utah 401, 60 P. 1013.
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Point IV
Section 5 Constitution of Utah provides for municipal corporations to be created by general laws on
a population basis by charter:
"Each city forming its charter under this section shall have, and is hereby granted, the authority to exercise all powers relating to municipal affairs, and to adopt and enforce within its
limits, local police, sanitary and similar regulations not in conflict with the general law, and no
enumeration of powers in this constitution or
any law shall be deemed to limit or restrict the
general
,, grant of authority hereby conferred;
The power and authority of municipalities in this
state to enact ordinances is derived from the legislature·,
S.L.C. vs. Sutter, 61 Utah 533, 216 P. 234 (see 15-850 UCA 1943).
The legislature has further authorized the cities
to control those acts as enumerated in UCA 10-8. Some
of these have already been mentioned in appellant's
brief. We call the court's attention to UCA 10-8-50,
which provides that the "city may punish ... indecent
or disorderly conduct, or lewd or lascivious behavior
... and such other petty offenses as the board or commission or city council may deem proper."
The legislature obviously realizes that they cannot
give explicit authorization in every field of human conduct where control would be desirable. They have
therefore in UCA 10-8-50 given the city authority to
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control those acts generally considered to be misdemeanors which the commission or council in their wisdom
may see fit.
Appellant further contends that the city has not
the power to make the act of "offering" a misdemeanor
and cites cases concerning "mere agreement to commit
a burglary, the mere agreement to commit larceny, the
mere agreement to commit forgery, etc." We submit
that there is a distinction to be drawn. One person
alone can commit burglary, larceny or forgery. One
person alone cannot commit the crime of prostitution
or sex acts for hire, "it takes two to tango". There
must be an agreement either expressed or implied between two or more individuals before the act can ever
take place. If the city desires to prevent the act, then
the logical place to start is to prevent the initial agreement.
If this Court finds that, contrary to appellant's
brief, a sex act for hire is a crime under the City Ordinances, then under the authority of UCA 10-8-84 the
City has the power to prevent that agreement which is
necessary to perpetrate the crime.
A municipal ordinance is presumed valid and should
be sustained when it bears a reasonable relationship to
the safeguarding of public health, safety and morals
... a city has a duty to use every legitimate means to
assure public peace and tranquility, and the constitutional rights of citizens to use skating rinks on an equal
basis has been held not to encompass a right to cause
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a disturbance. Mister Softee v. Mayor and Council
of City of Hoboken, 186 A 2d 513. This court has
state in the case of Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Dorke
et al, 50 Utah 114, 167 P. 241, 242, " ... to challenge
the constitutionality of a solemn and deliberate act of
legislation by the lawmaking power of a sovereign
state always presents a serious question, however trifling
or insignificant may be the amount involved in the particular case." In McQuillin on Municipal Corp., 3rd
Edition V 1 pg. 513, the author states a legislature
may create a "miniature state within its locality" and
further the municipal corporation serves to assist in
the government of the state § 2.09 and to promote
public welfare generally by exercising powers of the
s~ate. Poulsen v. Portland, 149 U.S. 30, and U.S. v.
Baltimore Railroad, 17 Wall (U.S.) 322.
When appellant says the ordinance must be construed against the city according to 1 Dillon on Municipal Corporations (5th Ed.) § 237, she fails to state
that such construction is in those cases where the state
law is contrary to city ordinances. That Dillon in
section 239 ( 91) says strict construction does not apply
to the "mode adopted by the municipality to carry into
effect powers expressly or plainly granted ... " where
not limited or prescribed by the legislature. The usual
test being reasonableness. § 238 provides "they may
exercise all the powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to
give effect to powers expressly granted and § 239 you
are to determine in favor of the state where city con-
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struction
struction
effect".

IS
IS

ambiguous but the first rule is the conto be just and give the ordinance "fair

As authority for strict construction and vagueness,
appellant cites City of Price v. Jaynes, 191 P2d 606.
In that case Price enacted an ordinance to secure the
right of persons not to be subjected to unreasonable
searches and seizures which offense was held laudable
but too vague. To avoid this decision the ordinance
must set out the act or acts prohibited and must spell
out what is under various situations an unlawful search
or seizure, as 32-2-1 does. Justice Wade concurring on
P. 611 said "a city may enact greater offenses (than
petty) where the legislature expressly grants it such
power" see Bohr v. Salt Lake, 79 Utah 121, 8 P2d 591,
and American Fork v. Charliere, 43 Utah 231, 134 P
739, American Fork v. Robinson, 77 Utah 168, 292
P 249, and American Fork v. Briggs, 43 Utah 252, 134
P. 747. Appellant also cites Ogden City vs. McLaughlin
et al, 188, 5 Utah 387, 16 P 721, which can be distinguished as those facts failed to show prostitution being
involved as it is in the instant case. Appellant's reliance
on page 12 of Salt Lake City v. Sutter ( 1923) 216
P. 234, fails to take cognizance of the fact that
the state in that case had extensive rules on liquor and
had only authorized the city to "license and regulate,
or prohibit the manufacturing, selling, giving away
or disposition . . . of liquors" and to "prevent intoxication, fighting, etc." That defendant was charged
with knowingly ha Ying liquor in his possession (a return
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to prohibition) and the court held against the city,
there being a direct conflict of laws. For a contrary
result see Zamata v. Browning, 51 Utah 400, 170 P
1057, wherein an ordinance prohibiting the sale of
liquor was upheld as it supported the existing state
law. Appellant also relies on City of Ogden v. Bear
Lake & River Water Works & Irrigation Co., 52
P967. To distinguish that case the court need only
note that Ogden sold its water system, which was
"dedicated to a public use", to Bothwell who let interests go to Bear Lake then Ogden deeming public
interest in jeopardy brought action to recover the
system and have a receiver appointed. The case was
remanded for trial as the charter authorized Ogden
to "purchase, receive, hold, sell, lease, convey, and
dispose of property, real and personal for the benefit
of the City." And the court felt the city officials must
protect city interests and acted beyond their authority
in making a patently bad deal.
The Respondent, Salt Lake City, is asking that
this court recognize a triportite division of all legislative subject matter: I. affairs exclusively of municipal concern, 2. affairs exclusively of state concern
and 3. affairs of both municipal and state concern.
Under this division where both are concerned both
should have concurrent legislative power and the local
regulation be held valid unless it conflicts with state
law. This court has already so held in Salt Lake City
v. Towne House Athletic Club and University Club,
#10640, dated February 27, 1967, wherein a general
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grant under UCA 10-8-39 to license and regulate was
held not preempted by a later specific grant not included in the general (Also American Fork v. Charliere, supra). A line of cases in Ohio headed by City
of Fremont v. Keating, 96 Ohio St. 468, 118 N E
114 (1917) upheld an ordinance identical to the state
statute establishing speed limits and prohibiting municipalities from enacting them as the result did not
frustrate the policy expressed by the state. The Utah
policy of suppression of prostitution, bawdy houses,
lewd acts, adultery and related sex acts is clear and
should be given effect by recognition of ordinances
drafted to carry out that expressed intention by prohibiting prositution of one's self or another to one individual. In re Hubbard (Supra 1964) ; the ordinance
prohibited participation in any "game of chance".
California has extensive gambling statutes but the
ordinance was upheld because it did not operate in a
field occupied by state legislation; it did not conflict
with general law and was a valid exercise of a "municipal officer". The court said:
"Since the general laws do not make illegal
all forms of gambling, or even all forms of gaming they cannot be said to occupy either field to
the exclusion of the exercise of local police power,
unless we adopt the negative type of argument
inherent in defendants contention, that is,that by
making specific acts illegal the Legislature intended all other acts of similar character to be
of such innocent character that no local authority
might adopt a contrary view .... "Accord, Prival
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v. :Mooney (1964) 62 A.C. 126, 396 P2d 815,
41 Cal. Rptr. 399.
Inherent in this division then are the tests that a
matter is the state's when 1. State laws are so comprehensive as to show an intent to preempt or, 2. They
express an intent to preempt or, 3. The subject is partially covered by state law and the effect on transient
citizens outweighs the possible benefits to the municipality. None of these tests would seem to apply in
the instant case against Mrs. Lovejoy.
The first category in which the affair is exclusively of municipal concern can be determined from
cases already decided, such as zoning. See William
E. Naylor v. Salt Lake City, #10373, filed February
9, 1966, wherein this court said a city commis~ion
charging with the duty of zoning "must necessarily
be allowed a wide latitude of discretion as to the manner
in which they can best be attained. In conformity with
well-established rules relating to the powers of administrative bodies, it is to be assumed that they have some
specialized knowledge of the conditions and the needs
upon which the discharge of their duties depends . . .
the court will not invade the province of the commission
and substitute its judgment therefore . . . " See also
Village of West Jefferson v. Robinson, 1 Ohio St. 2d
113, 205 N E 2d 382 (1965). Defendant was convicted
of soliciting door to door contrary to ordinance. That
finding was reversed, the appeal's court holding that
the state statutes did not undertake affirmatively to
regulate peddling but merely purported to limit the
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power of municipalities to do so. They interpret general
laws so that municipal autonomy is attained and a
statute would not be permitted to supersede a conflicting ordianance unless the subject matter was of statewide concern. Also ~lcElvoy v. City of Akron, 173
Ohio St. 189, 181 N E 2nd 26 (1962); Froelick v.
City of Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N E 212 ( 1919).
In another case, the City of Youngstown v. Evans,
168 N E 844 (1929), the court upheld an ordinance
which prescribed penalites in excess of those permitted
by a statute which purported to establish maximums.
They reasoned the statute was not a "general law"
because it was a limitation of municipal lawmaking
rather than a "rule of conduct." If limited curbs upon
local legislative authority were allowed t~re would be
no principle by which to draw a line and invalidate
an act prohibiting all municipal regulation.
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CONCLUSION

!

If the court looks past the procedural defects of
the appeal, it may establish criteria upholding ordinances where reasonable, as in this case, and thus prevent a ploy used by the defense in arguing that where
no state crime is enumerated the city is without
authority and where there is a state crime the state
has preempted the field.
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